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Abstract. We explore the concept of an agent-based Electronic Institu-
tion including a normative environment that supports electronic contract
formation by providing a contextual normative background. We formal-
ize the normative state using first-order logic and define institutional
rules and norms operating on that state. A suitable semantics regarding
the use of norms within a hierarchical context structure is given, based
on norm activation conflict and defeasibility. Norm activation relies on
substitution as in first-order logic. Reasoning about the fulfillment and
violation of deadline obligations is formalized using linear temporal logic;
implementation with institutional rules is discussed. Examples exploiting
the normative environment are given.
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1 Introduction
Electronic Institutions [1][2][3] have been proposed and developed as frameworks
embedding normative environments for open multi-agent systems, where hetero-
geneous and independently developed agents interact. Differences exist concern-
ing the conceptual views of the “institutional environment”. In [1] a restrictive
“rules of the game” approach is followed, where the institution fixes what agents
are allowed to do; norms are in this case a set of interaction conventions that
agents must conform to. In [2] the institution is seen as an external entity that
ascribes institutional powers and normative positions, while admitting norm vi-
olations and prescribing appropriate sanctions.
In our perspective [3], an Electronic Institution (EI) is a software framework
embracing a set of services and a normative environment. Those services are
meant to assist software agents in the process of creating organizational struc-
tures ruled by a set of mutual commitments, which in the end are translated into
norms. Such norms are part of the normative environment that is maintained
by the EI. In fact, one of the core services that we consider is the provision
of a supportive normative framework in the institutional environment, which
agents can exploit in order to establish their contracts in a more straightforward
fashion. Contracts [4] can be underspecified, relying on a structured normative
framework that fills in any omissions.
The purpose of this paper is to formalize this normative environment. We
define the notion of normative context, based on which a hierarchical structure
provides a normative background for electronic contracts. Within that struc-
ture, we characterize the normative state of the system and define rules and
norms operating on that state. We give a proper semantics for norms in our
system by defining norm activation conflict and by providing an approach for
conflict resolution based on defeasibility. We also detail the semantics of deontic
statements (namely obligations with deadlines) using temporal logic, and discuss
implementation issues.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our institutional nor-
mative environment, based on context structures, including the normative state,
rules and norms. Section 3 describes the semantics associated with norms, in-
cluding defeasibility; deadline obligation semantics is also explored and imple-
mented with rules. In Section 4 we illustrate the exploitation of the normative
environment. Section 5 concludes and discusses related work.
2 An Institutional Normative Environment
We explore the concept of an agent-based EI including a normative environment
as its core component. In the following definitions we try to provide a sound pre-
sentation of concepts in order to explain the use of norms within the normative
environment.
Definition 1. Normative Environment NE = 〈NS , IR,N 〉
The normative environment NE of an EI is composed of a normative
state NS, a set IR of institutional rules that manipulate that normative
state and a set N of norms, which can be seen as a special kind of rules.
While norms (see Def. 8) define the normative positions of each agent, the
main purpose of institutional rules (see Def. 7) is to relate the normative state
with the standing normative positions. A typical use of institutional rules is il-
lustrated in subsection 3.2, where they are employed to implement the semantics
of deadline obligations – rules monitor the normative state NS in order to de-
tect the fulfillment or violation of deontic statements. On the other hand, norms
“produce” those deontic statements upon certain normative state conditions.
2.1 Contexts
Our model is based on a contextualization of both the normative state and
norms. In this subsection we properly introduce the notion of context and context
organization.
Definition 2. Context C = 〈PC ,CA,CI ,CN 〉
A context C is an organizational structure within which a set CA of
agents commits to a joint activity partially regulated by a set CN ⊆ N of
appropriate norms. A context includes a set CI of contextual info that
makes up a kind of background knowledge for that context (see Def. 4).
PC is the parent context within which context C is formed. Let PCA be
the set of agents in context PC : we have that CA ⊆ PCA.
Contexts allow us to organize norms according to a hierarchical normative
structure. Norm set N is partitioned into the several contexts that may exist,
that is, sets CN for each context are mutually disjoint. Typically, we will have
CN ⊂ N , in which case more than one context has a non-empty set CN ; only if
all norms in N are defined in the same context we may have CN = N . A norm
inheritance mechanism, as explained later, justifies the fact that the locally-
defined set CN of norms only partially regulates the activity of agents in set
CA. We identify a top level context from which all other contexts are (directly
or indirectly) formed; every agent is committed to the top context.
We now introduce the notion of sub-context.
Definition 3. Sub-context C ′ = 〈PC ′,CA′,CI ′,CN ′〉
A context C ′ is a sub-context of a context C = 〈PC ,CA,CI ,CN 〉, de-
noted C ′ C C, if PC ′ = C or if PC ′ C C . When C ′ is either a sub-
context of C or C itself, we write C ′EC. From Def. 2 we also have that
CA′ ⊆ CA.
A sub-context defines a sub-activity committed to by a subset of the original
context’s agents. Notice that the sub-context relationship is an explicit one.
Every context is a sub-context of the top context.
We now turn to the definition of background information that may be defined
as a foundational element of a context.
Definition 4. Contextual info InfoC
Contextual info InfoC is a fully-grounded atomic formula in first-order
logic, which comprises founding information regarding a context
C = 〈PC ,CA,CI ,CN 〉. InfoC ∈ CI .
The CI component in a context definition is therefore composed of first-order
logic formulae that provide background information for that context.
A B2B analogy to this kind of context/sub-context relationship comes from
the virtual organizations realm, wherein a group of enterprises seeks to build
a mutually beneficial relationship regarding a specific business domain. They
would form a contractual agreement within the top institutional context. Of-
ten, a contract is dependent on the existence of another business relation, which
forms the business context for the new contract. Each contract must contain
a set of definitions regarding the role of the participants, the values to be ex-
changed (products or services) and their provision. In our model, these comprise
information that is intrinsic and foundational to the context associated with this
contract – hence the term contextual info.
In Section 4 a supply-agreement contract is described, in which a set of agents
agrees to supply certain resources under certain conditions. In that context, con-
textual info is expressed as first-order formula relating each agent with a resource
it supplies, together with an associated price: supply–infoC (Ag ,Res,UPr).
2.2 Normative State
The normative state is organized through contexts. The normative state concerns
the description of what is taken for granted in a model of so-called institutional
reality [5]. Therefore, we call every formula in NS an institutional reality element,
or IRE . Each IRE refers to a specific context within which it is relevant. There
can be more than one IRE pertaining to the same context.
Definition 5. Contextual institutional reality element IREC
A contextual institutional reality element IREC is an IRE regarding con-
text C. We distinguish the following kinds of IREC with the following
meanings:
ifactC (f , t) – institutional fact f has occurred at time t
timeC (t) – instant t has elapsed
oblC (a, f , d) – agent a is obliged to bring about fact f until deadline d
fulf C (a, f , t) – a has fulfilled, at time t, his obligation to bring about f
violC (a, f , t) – a has violated, at time t, his obligation to bring about f
Note that the use of context C as a superscript is only a syntactical conve-
nience – both contextual info and institutional reality elements are first-order
formulae (C could be used as the first argument of each of these formulae). While
contextual info is confined to background information that is part of the context
definition, contextual institutional reality elements represent occurrences taking
place after the context’s creation, during its lifetime.
We consider institutional facts as agent-originated, since they are obtained as
a consequence of some agent action [4]. The remaining elements are environment
events, asserted in the process of norm application and monitoring. Our model
of institutional reality is based on a discrete model of time. The time elements
are used to signal instants that are relevant to the context at hand. Obligations
are deontic statements, and we admit both their fulfillment and violation.
Definition 6. Normative State NS = {IREC11 , IREC22 , ..., IRECmn }
The normative state NS is a set of fully-grounded atomic formulae IRECji ,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, in first-order logic.
The normative state will contain, at each moment, all elements that charac-
terize the current state of affairs in every context. In that sense, NS could be
seen as being partitioned among the several contexts, as is the case with norms;
however, IRE ’s are not part of a context’s definition, since they are obtained
at a later stage, during the context’s operation. Some of the IRE ’s are inter-
related: for instance, a fulfillment connects an obligation to bring about a fact
with its achievement as an institutional fact. These interrelations are captured
with institutional rules.
2.3 Rules and Norms
Given the “contextualization” of the normative state, we are now able to define
rules and norms. Institutional rules allow us to maintain the normative state
of the system. They are not contextualized, but yet they operate on contextual
IRE ’s.
Definition 7. Institutional rule R ::= Antecedent → Consequent
An institutional rule R defines, for a given set of conditions, what other
elements should be added to the normative state. The rule’s Antecedent
is a conjunction of patterns of IREC (see Def. 5), which may contain
variables; restrictions may be imposed on such variables through rela-
tional conditions. We also allow the use of negation (as failure):
Antecedent ::= IREC | Antecedent ∧Antecedent | ¬Antecedent |
RelCondition
The rule’s Consequent is a conjunction of IREC which are not deontic
statements (IRE–C ), and which are allowed to contain bounded vari-
ables:
Consequent ::= IRE–C | Consequent ∧ Consequent
When the antecedent matches the normative state using a first-order logic
substitution Θ, and if all the relational conditions over variables hold, the atomic
formulae obtained by applying Θ to the consequent of the rule are added to the
normative state as fully-grounded elements.
Besides institutional reality elements, the norms themselves are also contex-
tual.
Definition 8. Norm NC ::= Situation → Prescription
A norm NC is a rule with a deontic consequent, defined in a specific
context C. The norm is applicable to a context C ′ E C. The norm’s
Situation is a conjunction of patterns of InfoC
′
and IRE–C
′
(no deon-
tic statements). Both kinds of patterns are allowed to contain variables;
restrictions may be imposed on such variables through relational condi-
tions:
Situation ::= InfoC
′ | IRE–C ′ | Situation ∧ Situation | RelCondition
The norm’s Prescription is a (possibly empty) conjunction of deontic
statements (obligations) which are allowed to contain bounded variables
and are affected to the same context C ′:
Prescription ::=  | OblConj
OblConj ::= oblC
′
(...) ∧OblConj | oblC ′(...)
Conceptually, the norm’s Situation can be seen as being based on two sets of
elements: background (Sb) and contingent (Sc). Background elements are those
that exist at context creation (the founding contextual info), while contingent
elements are those that are added to the normative state at a later stage. This
distinction will be helpful when describing norm semantics.
Observe the distinction between the context where the norm is defined, and
the context to which the norm applies. While, in order to make the model as
simple as we can, we define a norm as being applicable to a specific context, in
Section 3.1 we relax this assumption, which will in part clarify the usefulness of
the model.
3 Semantics
After defining each component of our normative environment, we now proceed
to defining the semantics of norms and deontic statements.
3.1 Norms and Contexts
We now turn our attention to norm applicability according to the normative
state. For that, we make use of the notion of substitution in first-order logic. We
denote by f ·Θ the result of applying substitution Θ to atomic formula f .
Definition 9. Norm activation
A norm NC = S → P , applicable to a context C ′ = 〈PC ′,CA′,CI ′,CN ′〉,
is said to be activated if there is a substitution Θ such that:
– ∀c∈Sc c ·Θ ∈ NS, where Sc is the set of contingent conjuncts (IRE–C ′
patterns) in S; and
– ∀b∈Sb b ·Θ ∈ CI ′, where Sb is the set of background conjuncts (InfoC ′
patterns) in S; and
– all the relational conditions over variables hold.
We are now able to define the notion of conflicting norm activations, as
follows.
Definition 10. Norm activation conflict
Let Act1 be the activation of norm NC11 = S1 → P1 obtained with substi-
tution Θ1 and Act2 the activation of norm NC22 = S2 → P2 obtained with
substitution Θ2. Let NS1 = {c ·Θ1 |c ∈ Sc1}, and NS2 = {c ·Θ2 |c ∈ Sc2},
where Sc1 and Sc2 are the sets of contingent conjuncts of S1 and S2,
respectively. Both NS1 and NS2 represent fractions of the whole norma-
tive state NS. Norm activations Act1 and Act2 are in conflict, written
Act1
⊗
Act2 , if NS1 = NS2 and either C1C C2 or C2C C1.
Succinctly, we say there is a norm activation conflict if we have two applicable
norms activated with the same fraction of the normative state and defined in
different contexts. Notice that the fact that both norms are activated with the
same contextual IRE ’s already dictates that the norm contexts, if different,
have a sub-context relationship (there is no multiple inheritance mechanism in
our normative structure). This becomes clearer when taking into account the
sub-context (Def. 3) and norm (Def. 8) definitions: a context has a single parent
context, and a norm NC applies to a context C ′ E C.
In principle, all norm activations are defeasible, according to the following
definition.
Definition 11. Norm activation defeasance
A norm activation Act1 for norm NC11 defeats a norm activation Act2
for norm NC22 if Act1
⊗
Act2 and C1C C2.
A defeated norm activation is discarded, that is, the defeated activation is
not applied to the normative state fraction used for activating the norm. Only
undefeated norm activations will be applied: the substitution that activated a
norm is applied to its prescription part and the resulting fully-grounded deon-
tic statements are added to the normative state (recall that there are no free
variables in the prescription part of norms). Observe that we do not talk about
norm defeasance, but rather norm activation defeasance. Thus, the defeasance
relationship may only materialize on actual norm applicability.
Norm Contextual Target. A question that may arise when going through
the previous definitions can jeopardize the purpose of having defeasible norms
as those in the model presented. Why should there be norms that, while being
applicable to the same context, are defined in different contexts that have a sub-
context relationship? Why not have all norms applicable to context C defined
inside context C?
The reason for our approach becomes apparent when considering the stated
aim of a supportive normative environment: to have a normative background
that can fill-in details of sub-contexts that are created later and that can benefit
from this setup by being underspecified. This leads us to the subject of “default
rules” in the law field [6]. Thus, part of the normative environment’s norms will
typically be predefined, in the sense that they are pre-existent to the applicable
contexts themselves. What we need is to typify contexts in order to be able to
say that a norm applies to a certain type of contexts. This way, a norm might
be defined at a super-context and applicable to a range of sub-contexts (of a
certain type) to be subsequently created.
We can do this adaptation by considering context identifier C as a pair
id:type, where id is a context identifier and type is a predefined context type. In
a norm NC = S → P (see Def. 8), patterns of InfoC ′ and IREC ′ inside S, as well
as obligations inside P , will be rewritten to accommodate this kind of context
reference, eventually using a variable in place of the context id . For instance, an
IRE Id:x pattern, where Id is a variable, would match IRE ’s of any sub-context
of type x. When activating a norm with this kind of pattern, the substitution
Θ (as used in Def. 9) would have to bind Id to a specific sub-context identifier;
every further occurrence of Id is thus a bounded-variable.
This approach allows us to maintain our definitions of norm activation con-
flict and defeasance, with minor syntactical changes.
3.2 Deadline Obligations
Our definition of norm includes the set of conditions upon which one or more
deontic statements come into being. As such, obligations being added to the
normative state are no longer conditional: they are deadline obligations, in the
sense discussed in [7].
In the following explanation we borrow some operators from linear temporal
logic (LTL) [8]. In LTL time is assumed to be discrete, has an initial moment
with no predecessors, and is infinite into the future. Let x = (s0, s1, s2, ...) be a
timeline, defined as a sequence of states si. The syntax x |= p reads that p is
true in timeline x. We write xk to denote state sk of x, and xk |= p to mean that
p is true at state xk.
The following operators shall be used:
– until (U): x |= (p U q) iff ∃j (x j |= q and ∀k<j (x k |= p))
– before (B): x |= (p B q) iff ∀j (x j |= q implies ∃k<j (x k |= p))
– henceforth (G): x |= Gq iff ∀j (x j |= q)
The fulf and viol terms in Def. 5 allow us to reason about the fulfillment and
violation of obligations. Using these terms, a deadline obligation oblC (a, f , t)
has the following semantics in LTL1:
(¬ifactC (f , ) ∧ ¬timeC (t) ∧ ¬fulf C (a, f , ) ∧ ¬violC (a, f , ))
U
(ifactC (f , t ′) ∧ ¬timeC (t) ∧Gfulf C (a, f , t ′) ∧G¬violC (a, f , ))∨
(¬ifactC (f , ) ∧ timeC (t) ∧G¬fulf C (a, f , ) ∧GviolC (a, f , t)) (1)
This means that no violations can occur before the deadline, nor fulfillments
before accomplishments; also, fulfillments and violations are mutually exclusive
and persist over time.
In order to make the above formalization more tractable, we relate a deadline
obligation with conditions for its fulfillment and violation. In LTL we express
these relationships with:
oblC (a, f , t) ∧ (ifactC (f , t ′) B timeC (t))⇒ Gfulf C (a, f , t ′) (2)
oblC (a, f , t) ∧ (timeC (t) B ifactC (f , ))⇒ GviolC (a, f , t) (3)
With this approach, we are basically depending on which comes first: the
deadline or the accomplishment of the fact. But in a model of discrete time,
they can occur simultaneously (which is captured by operator @ defined below).
In this case none of the above implications apply, therefore we add:
oblC (a, f , t) ∧ (ifactC (f , t) @ timeC (t))⇒ Gfulf C (a, f , t) (4)
where2 (ρ @ δ) ≡ (¬ρ U δ) ∧ (¬δ U ρ) ≡ ¬(ρ B δ) ∧ ¬(δ B ρ).
We want obligations not to persist after the deadline. This allows us to model,
within this framework, both cases of legal obligations, namely obligations that
1 The time arguments in ifact , fulf and viol are omitted except when they have a
correspondence, as expressed in (2) and (3).
2 (ρ @ δ) could also be defined as x |= (ρ @ δ) iff ∃j (x j |= (ρ ∧ δ) and ∀k<j (x k |= (¬ρ ∧ ¬δ)))
stand even when violated and those that do not. For instance [7], an obligation
to pay for a fine will persist if it is not fulfilled until the deadline, while an
obligation to submit a conference paper will not persist after the submission
deadline (because submitting makes no sense at that stage). For modeling a
standing obligation, the obligation can be reinstated after a violation is detected.
This property can be stated in a more general way: a fulfilled obligation can-
not be violated anymore, and a violated obligation cannot be fulfilled anymore.
oblC (a, f , t) ∧ fulf C (a, f , )⇒ G¬violC (a, f , ) (5)
oblC (a, f , t) ∧ violC (a, f , t)⇒ G¬fulf C (a, f , ) (6)
These relationships weaken the obligation’s power after it has been fulfilled
or violated.
Implementation with Institutional Rules. As mentioned before, the nor-
mative environment (Def. 1) includes a set IR of institutional rules (Def. 7) that
manipulate the normative state. Such rules allow us to implement the semantics
of deontic statements, as defined above. The fulf and viol terms in Def. 5 are
meant to allow us to reason about the fulfillment and violation of obligations
as soon as they occur, by defining norms that take these elements into account
in their antecedent. Institutional rules enable the specification of conditions for
fulfillment and violation detection.
According to the deadline obligation semantics described above, namely (2)
and (3), we may have the following institutional rules (where variables begin
with an upper-case letter):
oblC (A,F ,T ) ∧ ifactC (F ,T ′) ∧ ¬timeC (T )→ fulf C (A,F ,T ′) (7)
oblC (A,F ,T ) ∧ timeC (T ) ∧ ¬ifactC (F , )→ violC (A,F ,T ) (8)
But what if both the fact and the deadline hold at some point in time?
If (ifactC (f , ) B timeC (t)), then rule (7) asserted a fulfillment; on the other
hand, if (timeC (t) B ifactC (f , )) then rule (8) asserted a violation. But what if
(ifactC (f , ) @ timeC (t))? A rule like:
oblC (A,F ,T ) ∧ ifactC (F ,T ′) ∧ timeC (T )→ fulf C (A,F ,T ′) (9)
is not acceptable, as it would apply if (timeC (t) B ifactC (f , )). We need to keep
the property that after being violated, the obligation cannot be fulfilled anymore
(as in (6) above). We may say:
oblC (A,F ,T ) ∧ ifactC (F ,T ′) ∧ ¬violC (A,F , )→ fulf C (A,F ,T ′) (10)
It is tempting to also explicitly state that violations can only occur if no
fulfillment was achieved before. Something like:
oblC (A,F ,T ) ∧ timeC (T ) ∧ ¬fulf C (A,F , )→ violC (A,F ,T ) (11)
However, when taken together with (10), this would imply that a simulta-
neous occurrence of ifactC (f , ) and timeC (t) (that is, ifactC (f , ) @ timeC (t))
could bring either a fulfillment or a violation! We therefore must join (8) with
(10). (Notice that the pairing of (7) with (11) would bring a violation in the
simultaneity case.)
Practical Issues. If we cannot assume that the above rules are evaluated at
every normative state update, we may get unwanted results. For instance, as-
sume that the following are elements of the current normative state: oblC (a, f , t),
timeC (t) and ifactC (f , t + 1 ). If rules are applied only at time t′ > t, the viola-
tion would go unnoticed: rule (10) would apply, while rule (8) would not.
This problem can be overcome by referring explicitly to the time references
of IRE ’s:
oblC (A,F ,T ) ∧ timeC (T ) ∧ ¬(ifactC (F ,T ′) ∧ T ′ ≤ T )→ violC (A,F ,T )
(12)
oblC (A,F ,T ) ∧ ifactC (F ,T ′) ∧ T ′ ≤ T → fulf C (A,F ,T ′) (13)
If we are to relax the rule evaluation policy, the two rules for fulfillment and
violation detection must become independent. The shortcoming of this approach
is that it is directly applicable only when considering temporal deadlines.
Another problem that we do not consider is that we are assuming an instant
recognition of each IRE . That is, an institutional fact occurring at time t is
added at that same instant t to the normative state. Were that not the case, we
could get into situations where certain violations would need to be retracted as
new knowledge is acquired, otherwise inconsistencies might be obtained (which
could be avoided with an extra ¬violC (A,F , ) test in rule (13) above).
4 Examples
In this section we sketch some examples towards the exploitation of the nor-
mative environment. The examples are necessarily simple, in order to focus on
the important aspects of our approach; in the following we adopt the convention
that variables begin with an upper-case letter.
Suppose that a group of companies provide household appliance solutions to
their customers. However, while these solutions involve several kinds of equip-
ment, each of the companies manufactures only a subset of them. They agree to
form a virtual organization in order to better serve their customers.
This organization will define a supply-agreement that translates into a con-
text sa3:sa in the normative environment, where sa3 is the context id and sa is
the context type (see end of Section 3.1). Notice that sa3:sa C top, where top is
the top context.
Suppose we have, at the top context, the following norm:
N top1 = ifact
X:sa(order(A1 ,Res,Qt ,A2 ),T )∧
supply–infoX:sa(A2 ,Res,Upr)
→
oblX:sa(A2 , delivery(A2 ,Res,Qt ,A1 ),T + 2 )∧
oblX:sa(A1 , payment(A1 ,Qt ∗Upr ,A2 ),T + 2 )
The norm states that for any supply-agreement, when an order is made that
corresponds to the supply information of the receiver, he is obliged to deliver
the requested goods and the sender is obliged to make the associated payment.
Now, suppose context sa3:sa includes the following norms.
N sa3 :sa1 = ifact
sa3 :sa(order(A1 ,Res,Qt , jim),T )∧
supply–infosa3 :sa(jim,Res,Upr) ∧Qt > 99
→
obl sa3 :sa(jim, delivery(jim,Res,Qt ,A1 ),T + 5 )∧
obl sa3 :sa(A1 , payment(A1 ,Qt ∗Upr , jim),T + 2 )
This norm expresses the fact that agent jim, when receiving orders with more
than 99 units, has an extended delivery deadline.
N sa3 :sa2 = ifact
sa3 :sa(order(sam,Res,Qt ,A2 ),T )∧
supply–infosa3 :sa(A2 ,Res, )
→
obl sa3 :sa(A2 , delivery(A2 ,Res,Qt , sam),T + 2 )
N sa3 :sa3 = fulf
sa3 :sa(A2 , delivery(A2 ,Res,Qt , sam),T )∧
supply–infosa3 :sa(A2 ,Res,Upr)
→
obl sa3 :sa(sam, payment(sam,Qt ∗Upr ,A2 ),T + 2 )
These two norms express the higher position of agent sam who, as opposed
to other agents, only pays after receiving the merchandise. Suppose we have the
following founding contextual info for context sa3:sa:
supply–infosa3 :sa(jim, r1 , 1 )
supply–infosa3 :sa(sam, r2 , 1 )
supply–infosa3 :sa(tom, r3 , 1 )
Table 1 shows what might happen in different normative states. Lines labeled
with Conflict in the first column show what norm activation conflicts come
about (and how they are resolved) when the institutional reality elements of
their previous line (labeled with NS) are present. Lines labeled with NS′ show
the normative state after applying the defeating norm activation. Notice that
in the second example there is no conflict, since norm N sa3 :sa1 is not activated
because of a variable restriction.
Table 1. Different normative states and norm activation conflicts.
NS {ifactsa3 :sa(order(jim, r3 , 5 , tom), 1)}
Conflict none, N top1 applies
NS ′ {ifact
sa3 :sa(order(jim, r3 , 5 , tom), 1), oblsa3 :sa(tom, delivery(tom, r3 , 5 , jim), 3),
oblsa3 :sa(jim, payment(jim, 5 , tom), 3)}
NS {ifactsa3 :sa(order(tom, r1 , 5 , jim), 1)}
Conflict none, N top1 applies
NS ′ {ifact
sa3 :sa(order(tom, r1 , 5 , jim), 1), oblsa3 :sa(jim, delivery(jim, r1 , 5 , tom), 3),
oblsa3 :sa(tom, payment(tom, 5 , jim), 3)}
NS {ifactsa3 :sa(order(tom, r1 , 100 , jim), 1)}
Conflict N sa3 :sa1 defeats N
top
1
NS ′ {ifact
sa3 :sa(order(tom, r1 , 100 , jim), 1), oblsa3 :sa(jim, delivery(jim, r1 , 100 , tom), 6),
oblsa3 :sa(tom, payment(tom, 100 , jim), 3)}
NS {ifactsa3 :sa(order(sam, r3 , 5 , tom), 1)}
Conflict N sa3 :sa2 defeats N
top
1
NS ′ {ifactsa3 :sa(order(sam, r3 , 5 , tom), 1), oblsa3 :sa(tom, delivery(tom, r3 , 5 , sam), 3)}
NS
{ifactsa3 :sa(order(sam, r3 , 5 , tom), 1), oblsa3 :sa(tom, delivery(tom, r3 , 5 , sam), 3),
fulf sa3 :sa(tom, delivery(tom, r3 , 5 , sam), 2)}
Conflict none, N sa3 :sa3 applies
NS ′ {ifact
sa3 :sa(order(sam, r3 , 5 , tom), 1), oblsa3 :sa(tom, delivery(tom, r3 , 5 , sam), 3),
fulf sa3 :sa(tom, delivery(tom, r3 , 5 , sam), 2), oblsa3 :sa(sam, payment(sam, 5 , tom), 4)}
Observe that the model is very flexible, allowing us to specify different con-
tracting situations where the concept of norm activation defeasibility is useful.
5 Conclusions and Related Work
Our model of Electronic Institution [3][4] is based on an environment with a
hierarchical normative structure, including norm inheritance as a mechanism to
facilitate contract establishment. This paper formalizes such an environment.
We rely on a common normative structure applicable to several “social sys-
tems”, where the institution is prior in existence to the specific social relation-
ships (which are mapped to contexts). A different perspective is taken in [9],
where an electronic institution is coupled (situated) with a previously existing
social system. The authors also explore the possibility of autonomic adaptation
of the institution’s rules to enhance performance. In our case, adaptability is ad-
dressed by having a normative environment that agents can exploit and adapt
to fit their purposes.
The idea of context for normative reasoning has been studied before. How-
ever, in most cases the notion of context comes from the ‘counts-as’ relation
[10][11]: “X counts-as Y in context C”. For instance, in [12][13] a context gives
an interpretation to abstract norms of a broader context. There is a leveled struc-
turing of contexts, which broadly contemplates institutions, sub-institutions and
organizations, from the most abstract to the most concrete level. However, con-
crete norms (refined as rules and implemented as procedures) are used to model
preexistent organizations. Concept abstraction is studied in [14]. In this case, it
is not the norm that is abstract, but instead the concepts in which it is expressed.
A norm based on abstract concepts may be further specified in a more specific
context. Our approach has a different concern: we use the context structure for
designing a model of defeasibility for norms, which may be added to the system
at runtime. We do not tackle with abstraction.
The “contextualization” of contracts within higher normative structures has
also been advanced in [15]. In this case, a contract is modeled as an institu-
tion itself (see also [16]), and can be governed by another (super) institution.
This relationship is expressed through a mechanism of empowerment. States are
described by fluents and evolve according to rules expecting events. Empow-
erments are defined by normative fluents allowing the creation of events and
the initialization or termination of fluents. With this approach, a rule defined
in an institution may operate on another institution’s state if the rule’s effects
are explicitly empowered. In our approach, contracts are modeled as contexts
within a single institution. Norms can also operate in contexts other than the
one where they are defined, but this property is based on a structured normative
framework, and not on a discretionary basis that may be cumbersome to express.
From the law field, three normative conflict resolution principles have been
defined and traditionally used. The lex superior is a hierarchical criterion and
indicates that a norm issued by a more important legal entity prevails, when in
conflict with another norm (e.g. the Constitution prevails over any other legal
body). The lex posterior is a chronological criterion indicating that the most
recent norm prevails. The lex specialis is a specificity criterion establishing that
the most specific norm prevails. While not firmly adopting any of these options,
our approach resembles more the lex specialis principle. However, the defeating
norms are more specific in the sense that they are defined at (as opposed to
applied to) a more specific context (a kind of “lex inferior”). The lex specialis
flavor comes from the fact that in most cases a defeating norm should apply to
a narrower context-set.
These properties of our norm defeasance approach result from the fact that
the original aim is not to impose predefined regulations on agents, but instead
to help them in building contractual relationships by providing a normative
background (which can be exploited in a partial way). A feature of our approach
that exposes this aim is that all norms are defeasible. In this respect we follow
the notion from law theory of “default rules” [6]. We leave for future work the
possibility of defining non-defeasible norms, that is, norms that are not to be
overridden.
This notion of “default rules” might be misleading; it has not a direct corre-
spondence with default logic formalizations [17]. We do not handle the defeasi-
bility of conclusions of default rules in that sense, but instead model defeasibility
of the application of the rules themselves (which are called norms).
From a theoretical logical stance, norm defeasibility has been addressed in,
e.g., [18][19][20]. Typically, deontic reasoning guides these approaches, and thus
conflicts regard the deontic operators themselves. Our approach is centered in-
stead on the applicability of norms, not on their conclusions.
The work in [21] addresses the issue of conflict resolution in a structured
setup of compound activities. These resemble our context and sub-context re-
lationships. However, they model deontic conflicts (e.g. an action being obliged
and prohibited), while we model norm (activation) conflicts. They study the in-
heritance of normative positions (obligations, permissions, prohibitions), based
on an explicit stamping of each one of them with a priority value and a times-
tamp; the specificity criterion is based on the compound activities’ structure.
We address the inheritance of norms and provide a means to override norm
activations based on their defeasibility.
Our approach of context and sub-context definitions, together with the pre-
sented norm defeasibility model, is similar to the notion of supererogatory defea-
sibility in [22]. They model defeasibility in terms of role and sub-role definitions.
In fact, they also consider express defeasibility, which is based on the specificity
of conditions for norm applicability, but this approach has been followed by
several others.
The problem of normative conflict resolution has been also studied in more
practical approaches. The application of business rules in e-commerce has been
addressed in [23], where courteous logic programs allow for an explicit definition
of priorities among rules. An extension based on defeasible and deontic logic
has been advanced in [24] for the representation of business contracts (and not
merely business rules). However, this approach does not consider defeasibility
of norms between a contract and an underlying normative framework. Finally,
[25] also addresses defeasible reasoning in the e-contracts domain, based on the
translation of contracts from event calculus to default logic, and on the definition
of dynamic priorities among rules (by using domain-dependent criteria). Conflics
are, in this case, based on the normative positions of agents.
We should also point out that [26] presents a grammar for rules that combines
both our rule and norm definitions. However, our concern is to distinguish a
priori rule definition as a normative state maintenance issue from norm definition
as a contracting activity. Furthermore, in [26] there is no attempt to solve any
disputes related with possibly conflicting norms.
From a software engineering perspective, we envisage the development of dif-
ferent “enterprise agents” that encapsulate the private interests of the electronic
institution participants, and that engage in (partially automated) negotiations in
order to obtain mutually beneficial contracts. We have a working platform that
incorporates the needed infrastructure for the concepts introduced in this paper,
based on Jess [27] – a very efficient rule engine based on the Rete algorithm
for pattern matching. Another major effort concerns the knowledge engineer-
ing of norms applicable to different business contexts, in order to maximize the
usefulness of the normative background.
Some open issues in our research include, as already mentioned, the pos-
sibility of defining non-defeasible norms, which might be important in certain
contract domains. The development of multiple-inheritance mechanisms within
our contextual framework is also an interesting issue, although it poses additional
problems regarding norm defeasibility.
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